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THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. NATHANIEL
GAINES, Defendant and Appellant.

)

{l] Criminal Law - Plea - Withdrawal. - Defendant's attorney
properly exercised his discretion in withdrawing defendant's
plea of not guilty by reason of insanity to a charge of murder
where two of three appointed psychiatrists concluded that defendant was legally sane when the crillle was committed and
the third expert, though disagreeing with the conclusion of
the other two, concluded that he was unnble to determine with
any degree of certainty what defendant's mental status really
was at the time the crime was committed.
[2] Id.-Rights of Accused-Aid of Counsel.-That defense counsel in a murder prosecution decided not to bring before the
jury on the main trial the testimony of a psychiatrist to attempt to negate defendant's ability to form specific intent
but instead saved the point and exerted it as forcefully as
possible on the penalty trial before the same jury did not deny
defendant the effective aid of counsel.
[3] Id.-Rights of Accused-Aid of CJunsel.-Defendant's claim
that his trial counsel was guilty of an almost total resignation
from his responsibility to conduct a defense for defendant
was without merit where defendant did not suggest any additional questions that could have been asked or any witnesses
who could have been called in his behalf, and where the record
showed an adequate examination by defendant's trial counsel
of the witnesses called by the prosecution.
[4] Id.-Rights of Accused-Aid of Counsel.-In a murder prosecution in which defendant's identification was positive, the
description of the commission of the crime was clear, and the
murder weapon was traced to defe.ndllnt and was discovered
hidden in his home, defense counsel's waiver of argument on
the main trial was not a resignation from his responsibility
to conduct a defe.nse for defendant where counsel decided that
to make an argument with no reasonable possibility of success
on the main trial would lessen the impact of his argument on
[1] See 0a1.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 258 et seq.; Am.Jur.,
innl Law (1st ed § 289).
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Criminal Law, § 146 e.t seq.; Am.Jur.,
innl Law (1st ed § 167 et seq).
McK. Dill'. References: [1, 6J Criminal Ln,v, § 218; [2-5]
inal Law, § 107; [7J Criminal Law, § 632; [8] Criminal Law,
[9,10] Criminal Law, § 1010.
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the penalty phase :md where couns!'} al"g"ued the matter fully
and completely on that phase of the case.
[5] ld.-Rights of Accused-Aid of Counsel.-In a lllurder prosecution, defendant was not d!'nied the effective aid of counsel
by reason of his lawyer's failure to offer specific evidence and
instructions relating to the meaning and effect of a sentence of
life imprisonlllent on the main trial where the subject was
adequately covered during the. trial on the penalty phase of
the case, where defendant's counsel presented his case as expertly as did counsel for defendant's codefendants, and where
the trial techniques utilized by him gave defendant much mOI'e
than the minimum requirements for a fair defense.
[6] ld.-Plea-Withdra.wal.-Sincc. the statutes requiring that a
defendant make his plea himself in open court (Pen. Code,
§§ 1016-1018) relate only to the making of the plea and do not
require that a withdrawal of it he. made by defendant personally, it was not error in a murder prosecution to allow defendant's counsel to withdraw his plea of not guilty by reason
of insanity without defendant's being present.
[7] ld.-Argument of Counsel-Penalty Pha.se of Case.-In a murder prosecution, it was not error for the prosecutor to state
to the jury in his closing argument that defendant, if given a
life sentence, could be. paroled after serving seven years and
to ask the jury to keep that in mind in determining the penalty.
[8] ld.-Conduct of Counsel-Asking ImprDper Questions.-It was
not misconduct for the prosecutor, during the penalty phase of
a murder trial, to ask defendant and his codefendant whether
or not defendant's wife was present when he. and his codefendant had certain conversations concerning the robbery
of the store in which the homicide took place where no conversation between defendant :md his wife was ever elicited,
and where the presence of the wife at a meeting with the husband and other persons would void any possible confidentiality
that might have existed had the husband and wife been alone
together.
[9] ld.-Judgment-Determination of Penalty-Hearing.-It is
not error to permit the prosecution to give the opening and
elosing arguments to the jury on the penalty phase of a murder
trial.
•
[10] ld.-Judgment-Determination of Penalty-Verdict.-On the
penalty phase of a murder prosecution involving three defendants in which the jury had agreed on verdicts as to two
defendants, it was proper for the court to formally take the
verdicts on which the jury had agreed and then send the
jurors back to deliberate on the penalty for the third defendant who then had the right to, and did, waive further
deliberations by the jury Rnd leave his fate up to the trial
judge.
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APPEAL, automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239,
subd. (b), from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. J. Howard Ziemann, Judge. Affirmed.
Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction imposing
the death penalty, affirmed.
William B. Wolfson, under appointment by the Supreme
Court, for Defendant and Appellant.
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, William E. James, As·
sistant Attorney General, George J. Roth and Jack E. Goert·
zen, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

)

)

McCOMB, J.-This is an automatic appeal from a judg·
ment of guilty of murder in the first degree, pursuant to the
provisions of section 1239, subdivision (b), of the Penal Code.
The jury fixed the punishment at death.
Viewed in the light most favorable to the People, the
record discloses the following facts :
Mr. and Mrs. Broxton operated a neighborhood grocery
store. Between 7 :30 and 8 p. m. on November 26, 1960, Mrs.
Broxton was in the storage room when she heard a voice say,
"This is a stick.up. " She looked out into the main part of the
store, where she saw defendant with a gun in his hand, another
man wearing a blond wig and a mask, her husband, and Miss
Withers, an employee of the store.
Defendant commanded Mrs. Broxton to come out, and after
inquiring, "What is back there!" ordered her, Miss Withers
and Mr. Broxton back to the storage room, saying, "No funny
business. " Defendant followed them, and the other man
went to the cash register.
When they reached the back room, defendant told them to
sit down. He then told Mr. Broxton to lie down on the floor.
Mr. Broxton went down on his knees, and defendant directed
him to lie in a certain way. Mr. Broxton started to say some·
thing, and Mrs. Broxton said, "Don't, Honey. Do what he
says." Defendant told them he was worried about Mr. Brox·
ton, and Mr. Broxton lay down.
Defendant then told Mrs. Broxton to lie down. She said:
"I can't. I have arthritis in my knee. I can't lie down."
He said: "All right, I am not afraid of you. I want this big
boy."
Mr. Broxton then straightened out on the floor. Defendant
,walked over, placed a gun two or three inches from his head,
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and shot him, with the result that Mr. Broxton died. Defendant removed a billfold from Mr. Broxton's hip pocket
and walked out.
Defendant was identified by Mrs. Broxton and Miss Withers.
The gun which had been used had been taken out of pawn by
defendant a few days previously and was later discovered
under a water heater in his home.
Defendant presents these questions:
First. Was defendant ably defended by a deputy public
defender of the Los Angeles County Public Defender's Officer
Yes. Defendant contends that Mr. John Moore, a member
of the staff of the Los Angeles County Public Defender's
Office, ineptly handled the trial defense, with the result that
he was denied the right of effective aid of counsel, and such
aid as was rendered prejudiced the jury against him.
An examination of the record discloses that this contention
is devoid of merit. The lawyer representing defendant was
experienced and well qualified. (See People v. Hughes, 57
Ca1.2d 89, 99 [10] [17 Cal.Rptr. 617, 367 P.2d 33].) In the
present case the record shows that there was no misconduct
npon the part of defendant's attorney and that he ably represented defendant.
[1] Defendant's specific contentions are:
(a) That his attorney erred in withdrawing his plea of not
guilty by reason of insanity.
Originally defendant entered pleas of not guilty and not
guilty by reason of insanity. Two doctors were appointed,
pursuant to section 1027 of the Penal Code, to examine defendant as to his mental status. One of the doctors was further appointed under section 1871 of the Code of Civil Procedure, with electroencephalogram testing authorized. On
motion of defendant's counsel, a third doctor was appointed
under section 1871 of the Code of Civil Procedure" to conduct
examination of the defendant as to his sanity at the time of
the commission and presently." A fourth doctor was appointed "to conduct electroencephalogram tests . . . sleep recording and Metronal activation tests."
The record reveals that "the electroencephalogram was
normal, before, during and a~ter sleep and during, and after
metrazol activation" and that no abnormality was recorded.
Apparently two of the three appointed psychiatrists concluded that defendant was legally sane when the crime was
committed, for the third expert (Dr. McGinnis), in his report
filed with the court, refers to their examination and inferen-
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tially their conclusions, and states that he disagrees. Howcver,
he concluded in his report that he was" unable to determine
with any degree of eertainty, what the defendant's mental
status then. . . really was." 'Vhen cross-examined on the
witness stand, he testified: "Q. In other words, what you are
saying is that now he doesn't remember? You are not saying
at the time he didn't know what he was doing' You are not
saying that, is that right? A. That is quite right, yes."
With this information, defendant's eounsel withdrew the
previous plea of not guilty by reason of insanity.
Clearly, under the record there was no reasonable probability of any jury's eoncluding that insanity existed in defendant at the time of the commission of the crime, and therefore defense trial counsel properly exercised his discretion in
withdrawing the plea.
[2] (b) That defendant's counsel erred in not bringing
before the jury on the main trial the testimony of Dr.McGinnis to nega.te defendant's ability to form specific intent.
This contention is obyiously not well founded, for defendant's counsel was presented with a strategic problem in this
regard: knowing that the main trial would be followed by a
trial on the penalty by the same jury, should he take the
ehance of antagonizing them by trying to foree an extremely
weak theory of lack of intent, with the probable result that
they would show no sympathy for his client when the penalty
trial occurred, or should he save this point and then exert it
as forcefully as possible (as the reeord indicates he actually
did) on the penalty trial, where it might have some possible
impact to sway the jury to leniency in their verdict on the
penaltyt
Competent lawyers in the same situation ,vould disagree on
which course to take, depending on who they were, what their
overall defense was, what their discussions with their client
had elicited, and many other factors. Taking one view or the
other would not deny the client the effeetive aid of counsel.
[3] (c) That defendant's trial counsel was guilty of an almost total re'signati.on from his responsibility to conduct a
defense for defendant, in that he fa.iled to (1) prQperly crossexamine the prosecution's witnesses, (2) call any witnesses in
behalf of defendant, and (3) make an argument to the jury on
the main trial.
This contention is clearly without merit. Defendant's
eounsel on appeal has not suggested any additional questions
which could have been asked or any witnesses who could have
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been called in Il,·Iclillant ';; b,·lHl]f. An examination of the
record shows all adquatc examination of defendant's trial
counsel of the witllcsses called by the prosecution.
[4] Likewise, it would have been futile for defendant's
counsel to have argued to the jury on the main trial of the
case. Defendant's identification was positive, the description
of the commission of the crime was clear, and the murder
weapon was traced to defendant and was discovered hidden
in his home. Defendant's trial counsel, aware of the impending penalty trial, properly reached a decision that to make an
argument with no reasonable possibility of success on the
main trial would lessen the impact of his argument on the
penalty phase. He therefore waived argument on the main
trial and argued the matter fully and completely on the
penalty phase of the case.
[5] (d) That defendant's counsel should have offered
specific evidence and instructions rcZating to the meaning and
effect of a sentence of life imprisomnent.
This subject was adequately covered during the trial on the
penalty phase of the case. Defendant's counsel presented his
case as expertly as did counsel for each of the other two defendants, and the trial techniques utilized by him gave defendant much more than the minimum requirements for a fair
defense.
[6] Second. Was defendant's plea of not guilty by reason
of insanity properly withdrawn f
Yes. The record discloses that defendant did not personally
withdraw the plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, but
that the plea was withdrawn by his counsel. When the transcript on appeal was being prepared, the trial court's attention was directed to a discrepancy between the reporter's
transcript and the clerk's transcript relating to the personal
waiver of the plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. The
following occurred: "THE COURT: In that connection I would
like the record to sho,,, that there were several doctors who
had been appointed to examine the defendant and to advise the
Court. There was Dr. Crahan and Dr. Abe, and as late a!'l
May 5th, i>r. McGinnis and Dr. Alberto Mariacci had examined the defendant and reported to both ('ounsel and to the
Court. I think it was on the basis of those reports which
were made a part of the record here, that ('onnspl withdrew
the plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. MR. LENOIR: I
am not disputing with the Court in that regard. The only
thing I am asking is that the Clerk's transcript should be the
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!;<une as the reporters' transcript, whk·It I think correctly reflects the proceedings had on this matter. TIlE COURT: Very
wcll. I will order the Clerk's transcript to be corrected to
~how that the. defendant did not personally withdraw the plea
or not guilty by reason of insanity, but that that was done by
II is counsel.' t
.
~
It is clear that a criminal defendant's plea of not guilty
by reason of insanity must be made by the defendant him,sel/
ill open court. Section 1016 of the Penal Code provides that
there are "five kinds of pleas" to an indictment, information,
01' complaint, and the fifth enumerated plea is "Not guilty
by reason of insanity." Section 1017 sets forth the proper
form for each of these five pleas, and the immediately following section, 1018, flatly directs that unless otherwise provided
by law, "every plea" lUust be put ill by "the defendant himself in open court."
The code sections, however, relate only to the making of the
Illea; they do not require that a withdrawal of it be made by
the defendant personally, and we should not read such a requirement into the statutes. In the absence of a statute requiring that the withdrawal of a plea of "not guilty by reason
. of insanity" be made by a defendant himself. or the presence
of some compelling circumstance not shown here, we should not
depart from the customary practice by which an attorney
acts for his client throughout the trial.
'1'he fact that section 1018 refers only to the making of pleas
may have led many attorneys and judges to believe that pl('as
eould properly be withdrawn by the attorney, and under these
circumstances it would seem improper to reverse convictions
merely because such a procedure had been followed, and in
the present case no claim is made by defendant that his attorney lacked authority to withdraw the plea.
The case of PeopZe v. Rogers, 56 Ca1.2d 301 [14 Cal.Rptr.
660, 363 P.2d 892]. is distinguishable on its facts. There
the defendant pleaded not guilty and waived trial by jury, and
thereafter hi, attorney and the prosecutor entered into a
stipulation before the trial judge "that Your Honor will be
restricted to either a finding of second degree murder or a
finding of voluntary or involuntary manslaughter and that
Your Honor would be precluded from a finding of first degree
\ murder or a finding of not guilty under the circumstances."
Since the quoted language specifically precluded the trial
judge from finding the defendant not guilty, the stipulation
necessarily amounted to a plp.a of guilty, in the alternative, to
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one of the specific crimes refcrred to, the choice to be made by
the judge after hearing the evidence. The stipulation, of
course, involved the withdrawal of the prior plea of not guilty,
but it also constituted the making of a plea of guilty, and this
fact brought it directly within the language of section 1018.
Since the guilty plea was not made by the defendant hirnself,
we reversed the judgment.
In the present case it was not necessary for defendant himself to request a withdrawal of the plea of "not guilty by
reason of insanity" in order to remove that issue from the case,
and the trial court did not err in permitting the withdrawal
of the plea to be made by defendant's attorney.
[7] Third. Did the prosecution commit prejudicial error
in the trial of the case T
No. Defendant contends that "the prosecutor blatantly
misstated the law"; that it "would appear the prosecutor is
going to ease the difficult path ahead of appellant if he is
paroled after receiving sentence of life imprisonment by the
simple expedient of executing him now"; and that the prosecutor's remarks relating to the effect of a sentence of life imprisonment gave the jury the impression that defendant, if so
sentenced, "would be out in seven years. "
On the contrary, the record indicates that the prosecution
displayed rather unusual restraint in the presentation of its
case in view of the brutal nature of the crime.
Relative to the contention that the prosecuting attorney
misled the jury as to the effect of life imprisonment, the
record discloses that in his closing argument he stated: ". . .
when and if these persons come before them [the Adult Authority], they have the verdict of the jury that life is an appropriate penalty-and life in California means they can be
paroled and nobody says we are going to keep them for a
thousand years any more than I would concede they are
going to let them go after seven years. I never intended by
my expressions to infer that as soon as the seventh year fell
they automatically throw the gates wide open. All I mean
to say is that is a fact that they may be paroled from prison,
and I ask you to take that in mind in determining . . . the
penalty. ' ,
~
An examination of the record discloses that various other
remarks of the prosccution which defendant admits are not
individually prejudicial were not collectively so, and therefore under article VI, section 4 1/z, of the Constitution would
not warrant a reversal of the judgment.

)
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[8] Fourth. Did qucstions addressed to defendant and his
codefcndants relative to whether dcfcndant's wife was presc1lt
at a mceting with them constitute prejudicial error?
No. Defendant complains of certain questioning by the prosecution on the penalty phase of the trial relating to whether or
not his wife was present when he and his codefendants had
certain conversations concerning the robbery of the Broxtons'
store.
No conversation between defendant and his wife was ever
elicited. In addition, the presence of the wife at a meeting
with the husband and other persons would void any possible
confidentiality which might have existed had the husband and
the wife been alone together. (McCormick, Evidence (1954)
§ 84, p. 172.)
[ 9] Fifth. Did the trial COUt·t commit prejudicial error in
permitting the prosecution to givc the opening and closing
arguments to the jury em the penalty phase?
No. (People v. Corwin, 52 Ca1.2d 404, 407 [2] [340 P.2d
626] ; cf. People v. Purvis, 52 Ca1.2d 871, 884 [346 P.2d 22].)
[10] Sixth. Did the trial COUt·t err by taking verdicts in
regard to only two of the defendants on the penalty phase'
No. Defendant contends that the court committed error in
taking the case from the jury on the penalty phase of their
deliberations. The record shows that the jury retired for
deliberations on this phase of the case on Wednesday, May 24,
1961. On Friday morning, May 26, 1961, they returned to the
courtroom at 11 :10 a. m. to have read to them the testimony
of defendant Rollins (a codefendant) and his wife. At 11 :55
a. m. the jury retired for further deliberations.
At 3 :43 p. m. the court called the jury back into the courtroom, and the following proceedings occurred: "THE COURT:
Let the record show that the three defendants and theirrespective counsel are present, and that the members of the jury and
the alternates are in their proper places in the jury box. Mr.
Foreman, my inquiry is not in the nature of one trying to
hasten or push you, but it is simply one of inquiry. Have you
been able to reach any verdicts yet T MR. SCURR: Yes, your
Honor. Tim COURT: As to one or all of the defendants T MR.
SCURR: As to two of the defendants. THE COURT: Would you
hand those verdicts to the bailiff, please TMR. SCURR: I did not
bring those verdicts with me. As yet, they are not signed. THE
COURT : Well, they are not verdicts then. MR. SCURR: W ('
reached our final decision on them, but they were not signed
because it was our understanding we sign them all at once.
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THE COURT: Let me iuC}uire as to the remaining defendant,
do you think you can reach a verdict 1 MR. SCURR: Yes, your
Honor, I pt'rsonally do. THE COURT: Shortly, or over the weekend' MR. SCURR: '.Vell, I think we can have a verdict tomorrow, if you want it done. MR. LENOIR: May we approach the
bench, your Honor' THE COURT: Yes, will counsel approach
the bench, plcase."
'rhe following proecl'uiugs were then had at the bench,
outside the hearing of the jury: "Ma. LENOIR: I don't know
what the procedure is, but when the foreman said ]le thought
they could reach a verdiet as to the other defendant, one juror
in the baek-I believe she is Number 10-she shook her head
in a negative fashion. THE COURT: Mrs. Tisherman. MR. LE~OIR: Yes, your Honor, I made that observation, and I don't
know what the procedure is. THE COURT: I would suggest
we send them back anu let thcm sign the two verdicts, and
then let them see what th('y ean do about the remaining on('.
MR. HOWARD: That is perfectly agreeable to the People. THE
COURT: Any objections? MR. MOORE: No objections. MR.
LENOIR: No objections, your IIonor. MR. JEN"SEN: No objections. THE COURT: All right, I will so instruct them."
The following proceedings then took place in open court, in
the presence and hearing of the jury: "THE COURT : Would the
jury please retire to the jury room and sign the verdicts on
which you have agreed and then return to the Courtroom T
All defendants and counsel may wait in the Courtroom until
the jury returns."
The jury left the courtroom at 3 :50 p. m. for further deliberations and returned at 3 ;55 p. m.
The jury fixed defendant's penalty at death and cof1efendant Barnes' penalty at life imprisonment. After the jr..ry was
polled and these verdicts were recorded, the follow tug oceurred: "THE COURT: Now, as to your verdict on the third
defendant, Clifford Milton Rollins, do you still think :rou can
reach a verdict after more deliberations ¥ MR. SCURR: Y,,g, your
Honor. THE COURT: All right, the jury may retire for further
deliberations. "
The jury retired to the jury room at 4 :10 p. m. for further
deliberations. Subsequently, the following transpired: "MR.
JENSEN [Attorney for codefendant Rollins] : If it please the
Court, the Court inquired whether we desired further deliberations by the jury. THE COURT: That is correct. MR. JENSEN:
I would like to ask the Court, does the Court mean that the
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jury ean be stopped from further deliberations' TBlI: COURT:
At this time, there are two choices available to you. You can
allow the jury to continue with their deliberations until they
reach a verdict, or you can ask that it be taken from the jury
on the ground that the jury . has not been able to reach a
verdict. Ma. JENSEN: I would like the Court to declare the
jury unable to reach a verdict. THE COURT: Then do you want
another jury to fix the penalty, or do you want the Court to 1ix
the penaltyf Ma. JENSEN: I want the Court to fix the penalty.
THE COURT: You want me to fix it, then T Ma. JENSEN : Yes,
that is our desire, your Honor. THE COURT: Is that what you
want me to do, Mr. Rollins? DEFENDANT RoLLINS: Yes. THE
COURT: Is there any opposition' MR. JACOBSON: No, your
Honor, the People have no objection. THE COURT: Very well.
Mr. Bailiff, bring the jury back in. "
At 4:40 p. m., the members of the jury and the alternates
returned to the courtroom, and the following proceedings were
had in the presence and hearing of the jury: "THE COURT:
Let the record show the defendant Rollins is present with his
counsel, the Deputy District Attorneys are present, and the
members of the jury and the alternates are all in their proper
places in the jury box. On motion of defendant's counsel, I am
going to dismiss the jury. I feel you have done a very good job
up to now, and I doubt whether you will reach a decision
within a convenient time, so I will dismiss the jury. I want to
thank you for your verdicts, and as a matter of fact, you have
arrived at exactly the same place I have arrived at." The
court then fixed the penalty of defendant Rollins at life imprisonment.
Section 1160 of the Penal Code provides, in part: "On a
charge against two or more defendants jointly, if the jury
cannot agree upon a verdict as to all, they may render a
verdict as to the defendant or defendants in regard to whom
they do agree, on which a judgment must be entered accordingly. and the case as to the other may be tried again."
Since the jury actually had agreed upon a verdict as to
defendant, it was proper for the court to formally take the
verdict and then send the jurors back to deliberate on the
penalty for hiS codefendant Rollins. Likewise, defendant Rollins had the right to waive further deliberations and leave
his fate up to the trial judge. '
An examination of the record discloses that it is free from
prejudicial error and that defendant had a fair trial, well
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represented by a competent attorney before an able and impartial trial judge.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., and White, J., concurred.

)

TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent.
Defendant's plea of not guilty by reason of insanity was
improperly withdrawn. Penal Code section 1018 unequivocally
provides that "Unless otherwise provided by law every plea
must be put in by the defendant himself in open court." Penal
Code section 1016 enumerates the five pleas that may be
entered, including" 5. Not guilty by reason of insanity." Read
together these sections set forth a clear statutory procedure:
unless otherwise provided by law, the pleas enumerated in
section 1016 must be put in by the defendant himself in open
court. The purpose of section 1018 is to ensure that the defendant in a criminal action personally puts in issue the issues
raised under any of the pleas included in section 1016. Since
the withdrawal of a plea removes from litigation an issue that
the defendant has personally put in issue, the withdrawal must
also be by the defendant personally. Otherwise the issues to be
litigated would not include those raised by defendant personally. Defendant had personally put his sanity in issue by
his plea in open court of not guilty by reason of insanity. That
issue remained in the case, for it was not personally withdrawn
by defendant. Counsel's withdrawal of the plea of not guilty
by reason of insanity removed a legal excuse for the crime
and was in effect a plea that" whereas before I pleaded that I
did not do this act, but if I did, I am to be excused, now I
plead that I did not do this act, but if I did, I have no excuse. "
Such a plea was not defendant's own as section 1018 requires.
In People v. Rogers, 56 Ca1.2d 301 [14 Cal.Rptr. 660, 363
P.2d 892), we reversed a judgment of conviction of murder
in the second degree where, after defendant had personally
pleaded not guilty pursuant to section 1018, counsel stipulated
that the trial court be restricted to finding the defendant guilty
of murder iJ} the secoud degree or of manslaughter and precluded from a finding of first degree murder or a finding of
not guilty. We held that the stipulation violated section 1018
"since it purported to eliminate from the trial the question
of defendant's innocence." (56 Ca1.2d at 306.) Similarly, the
withdrawal of defendant's plea of not guilty by reason of
insanity eliminated from the trial the question of his sanity
•
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at the time of the commission of the offense. If counsel may
remove from litigation issues that the Legislature has directed
must be personally put in issue by the defendant and that
have been personally put in issue by him, the purpose of the
statute is frustrated.
There. is no merit in the contention that the plea of not
.guilty by reason of insanity is not one that section 1018
requires the defendant to make himself in open court since
4' such plea is only an admission of commission of the acts
charged, coupled with a denial of guilt ... resting upon the
remaining defense of insanity." (People v. Pincus, 131 Cal.
,App. 607, 610 [21 P.2d 964J.) That contention is contrary
to the plain mandate of section 1018; nor does the Pincus case
support it. That case involved the entry by the defendant's
counsel of a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity after the
defendant had entered and withdrawn his plea of not guilty.
Thus the defendant was not deprived of a trial on any issue
that he had personally put in issue. Moreover, he personally
waived a jury trial on the issue of insanity. On the facts of
that case, the court correctly held that the plea "was really
a plea by defendant himself, and that it did not result, by
reason of the form in which it was made, in a miscarriage of
justice, nor did it deprive defendant of any right..• ~" (131
Cal.,App. at p. 610.)
It is immaterial that the plea of not guilty by reason of
insanity has been characterized as procedural rather than substantive for the purpose of determining whether the issue of
sanity could be constitutionally determined in a separate trial.
(See People v. Troche, 206 Cal. 35, 44 [273 P. 767J ; People v.
Leong F'ook, 206 Cal. 64, 74-75 [273 P. 779].) The question in
the present case is whether that issue is to be determined at
all, for the withdrawal of defendant's plea deprived him of
the right to a jury trial on the issue of his sanity as guaranteed by Penal Code section 1026. Error that results in the
deprivation of a basic right necessarily requires reversal to
preclude prejudice to the judicial process and to the procedural.rights of a litigant even though there might be equally
fair alternatives consonant with due process. (People v.
Rogers, 56 Ca1.2d 301, 307 [14 Cal.Rptr. 660, 363 P.2d 892J ;
People v. Holmes, 54 Cal.2d 442 [5 Cal.Rptr. 871, 353P.2d
583J; In re Brain, 70 Cal.,App. 334, 335 [233 P. 390].)
In People v. Rogers, supra, we reversed the judgment even
though counsel's improper withdrawal of the plea of not guilty
was designed to benefit the defendant. In People v. Holmes,
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supra, we reversed the judgment on the ground that the

defendant had not personally waived his right to a jury trial.
"Experience has shown that there is sound reason for this
requirement. If the waiver were left to implication from conduct, there would be a danger of misinterpretation with respect
to a right the importance of which requires there be certainty.
Moreover, appellate courts would be faced with the burdensome task of determining whether the facts of the particular
case warrant such an implication, whereas trial eourts, without
any difficulty, can eliminate doubt and safeguard the rights
of both the defendant and the People by obtaining express
statements from the defendant, from his attorney, and from
the prosecuting attorney not merely as to whether a trial by
jury is desired but specifically that a jury is or is not waived. "
(54 Ca1.2d at p. 444.) "Manifestly the entry of a plea in a
prosecution for a felony cannot be said to be less important
than the waiverof trial by jury." (People v. Rogers, 56 Ca1.2d
301, 307 [14 Cal.Rptr. 660, 363 P.2d 892].)
It is immaterial that until the opinion in this case was filed,
defendant made no claim "that his attorney lacked authority
to withdraw the plea." In presenting his appeal, he was entitled to rely on the settled rule that a failure to comply with
section 1018 requires reversal on appeal, for the very purpose
of that section is to avoid uncertainties as to a defendant's
intent in entering or withdrawing his plea. Moreover, now that
the court has stated that such a claim is relevant, defendant
has filed an affidavit that he did not authorize the withdrawal
of his plea of not guilty by reason of insanity and that he believed at the time of the trial that the issue of sanity was being
litigated during the trial on the issue of penalty.! His trial
1"1. NA'l'BANII!:L GAINES, being first sworn, depose and say:
I I That in the trial of the above-entitled action, at no time was there
any diseussion whatsoever had between myself and my attorney, JOHN
MooRE, regarding the withdrawal of my plea of 'Not Guilty By Reason of
Insanity'; that at no time, either befort', during or for some period of
time after the conclusion of said trial was I ever aware that I was not to
have and did not have a trial on the issue of my sanity at the time of the
commission of the offense alleged as a result of said plea of 'Not Guilty
By Reason of Insanity'; that at no time ever, did I or have I authorized,
instrueted, suggested or acquiesced in the withdrawal of said plea of
'Not Guilty By Reason of Insanity'; but thnt I, at nil times until the
certification of the transcript on appeal, was under. the impression that
I was to and did receive a trial on the issue of sanity at the time of the
offense charged; that I was under the impression at all times until said
certification that the penalty phase of my trial was in truth and fact the
trial on the issue of sanity as raised by my plea of 'Not Guilty By
Reason of Insanity' as well as the penalty phase should it be determined
therein that I was sane at the time of the offense charged; that such
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counsel has also filed an affidavit that he does not recall discussing the withdrawal of the plea with defendant. If defendant did not authorize the withdrawal of the plea, he has berB
denied the right to a jury trial on a vital issue in his ease, and
habeas corpus will lie to determine whether the withdrawal of
the plea was in fact authorized. (In re Martinez, 52 Cal.2d 80S,
815 [345 P.2d 449].) The error in permitting defendant's
counsrl to withdraw his plea should be corrected on appeal,
however, and the problem of collateral attack on the judgment
thereby obviated.
There is no merit in the contention that the error was not
prejudicial. In In re Brain, supra, the defendant's attorney
had improperly entered a plea of guilty to a charge of burglary. The court held that" [s]ection 4112 or article VI of
the constitution could not be applied in the instant case even
though we considered the error a procedural one, because of the
absence of any record upon which we might judge of the guilt
or innocence of the petitioner." (70 Cal.App. at p. 335.) Similarly, the improper withdrawal of defendant's plea of not
guilty by reason of insanity in the present case has deprived
this court of a record as to defendant's sanity from which to
determine the effect of the error. How then can it reasonably
be said that an examination of the entire record discloses that
there has not been a miscarriage of justice, when a record on
the crucial issue does not exist because of the withdrawal of
defendant's plea f The only evidence bearing upon defendant's competency at the time the offense was committed is
that introduced in mitigation of the penalty under Penal Code
section 190.1. To conclude from a review of this evidence that
belief on my part was affirmed and justified by the presentation of medi·
cal testimony concerning my sanity during the penalty hearing.
"I further declare that until I received a copy of the transcript on
appeal did I realize that I had not yet had a trial on my plea of 'Not
Guilty By Reason of Insanity'; that I am a layman and completely
unfamiliar with the proceedings leading up to and including trial, but
that since my only defense to the crime charged was my complete
inability to remember the acts with which I was charged, my only excuse
would be insanity; that had I been informed that my plea of 'Not Guilty
By Reason of Insanity' was to have been withdrawn, I would not have
acquiesced in or approved of such withdrawal under any circumstances
whntsoevar.
"That this affidavit is executed for the purpose of setting out the true
facts surrounding the withdrawal of the insanity plea in my ease as I
know them, is true and correct and is made in support of a petition for
rehearing following the decision in the above·entitled ease.

lsI

NATHANIEL GAINES
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defendant could not sustain the burden of proving his insanity
assumes that the evidence offered in mitigation of the penalty
was necessarily identical with the evidence that would have
been offered on a sanity hearing. Even if defendant would have
introduced the same evidence, his right to a jury determination
of his sanity precludes this court from determining that issue
for the first time on appeal.
Peters, J., and Tobriner, J., concurred.

App~llant 's petition for a rehearing was denied November
21, 1962. Traynor, J., Peters, J., and Tobriner, J., were
of the opinion that the petition should be granted.
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